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   If	  the	  world	  had	  been	  a	  family	  in	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  Japan	  would	  have	  been	  the	  little	   brother,	   unsure	   of	   how	   to	   behave,	   but	   heavily	   in9luenced	   by	   how	   its	   older	   siblings	  acted.	  Japan’s	  rapid	  industrialization	  helped	  it	  to	  achieve	  military	  and	  economic	  parity	  with	  many	   of	   its	   surrounding	   states,	   allowing	   the	   tiny	   island	   nation	   to	  win	   the	   Sino-­‐Japanese	  War	  in	  1895	  and	  the	  Russo-­‐Japanese	  War	  ten	  years	  later.	  These	  victories,	  especially	  against	  Russia,	   surprised	   the	   world	   and	   lent	   Japan	   a	   new	   air	   of	   legitimacy	   as	   a	   major	   military	  power.	  In	  occupying	  this	  new	  role,	  Japan	  would	  go	  on	  to	  9ight	  against	  the	  Central	  Powers	  in	  the	  First	  World	  War,	  declaring	  war	  on	  Germany	  in	  1914	  to	  honour	  its	  alliance	  with	  Britain. 	  1Germany’s	  territory	  in	  China	  was	  surrendered	  to	  the	  Japanese	  in	  a	  matter	  of	  weeks,	  ending	  Japan’s	   involvement	   in	   the	   war	   quickly	   and	   decisively.	   This	   easy	   victory	   instilled	   in	   the	  Japanese	  a	  sense	  of	  con9idence;	  after	  45	  years	  as	  a	  minor	  power,	  watching	  the	  rest	  of	   the	  world	  operate,	   Japan	  now	  considered	   itself	  among	  the	  major	  players	  on	  the	  world	  stage. 	  2Indeed,	  its	  victory	  against	  Russia	  in	  1905	  and	  Germany	  in	  1919	  solidi9ied	  Japan	  as	  such	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  Western	  powers.	  However,	  in	  the	  span	  of	  25	  years,	  Japan	  would	  systemically	  alienate	  each	  of	  its	  newfound	  friends.	  How	  could	  a	  nation	  so	  promising	  in	  its	  appearance	  on	  the	  world	   stage,	   so	  quick	   to	   grasp	   the	  ways	  of	   the	  new	  world	   in	  which	   it	   found	   itself,	   so	  surprisingly	  adept	  at	  modern	  war	  and	  economics,	  lose	  every	  ally	  it	  had	  in	  such	  short	  order?	  Why	   did	   the	   West	   go	   from	   brisk	   trade	   and	   military	   alliance	   with	   Japan	   to	   implicit	  displeasure	  with	  it?	  Why	  did	  Japan	  “switch	  sides”	  in	  the	  interwar	  period?	  	  The	   answer	   is	   threefold.	   First,	   while	   the	   European	   powers	   spent	   400	   years	  developing	   their	   culture	   through	   exploration,	   colonization,	   and	   imperialism,	   Japan	   was	  looking	   inward,	  nurturing	   its	  unique	  cultural	  and	  philosophical	  views	  which	  continues	   to	  in9luence	   its	   people	   into	   the	   twenty-­‐9irst	   century.	   Second,	   when	   Japan	   stepped	   into	   the	  wider	  world	   and	   saw	   each	   nation	   as	   a	   sprawling	   empire,	   it	   was	   forced	   by	   its	   newfound	  neighbours	   to	   embrace	   their	   imperial	   attitudes	   and	   industrialize	   quickly,	   a	   process	   that	  imprinted	  a	  very	  rigid	  worldview	  upon	   the	   Japanese,	  which	  would	  prove	   in9lexible	   in	   the	  face	  of	  new	  ideologies.	  Third,	  once	  its	  European	  allies	  moved	  on	  from	  imperialism	  after	  the	  First	  World	  War,	  Japan	  was	  seen	  as	  both	  inferior	  to	  the	  West	  and	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  Wilsonian	  idealism	   for	   clinging	   to	   the	   imperial	  ways	   it	  had	   learned	   from	   those	   same	  allies	   some	  50	  years	  prior.	  These	  three	   factors	   formed	  the	  backbone	  of	   Japanese	   identity	   in	  the	   interwar	  years.	   They	  would	   also,	   ultimately,	   push	   Japan	   down	   the	   path	   to	   confrontation	  with	   the	  nations	  that	  had	  ushered	  it	  into	  the	  modern	  era.	  	   To	  understand	  the	  actions	  of	  any	  state,	  one	  must	  explore	  the	  cultural	  history	  of	   its	  people.	  The	  mindset	  of	  a	  nation	  develops	  over	  time,	  in	  response	  to	  many	  stimuli.	  In	  Japan,	  that	   mindset	   can	   be	   summed	   up	   in	   two	   words:	   Bushidō	   and	   Shinto.	   Normally	   de9ined,	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respectively,	  as	  a	  philosophy	  and	  a	  religion,	   these	  two	  concepts	  became	  enmeshed	  during	  Japan’s	   long	   feudal	   age.	   Both	   are	   unique	   to	   Japan,	   though	   informed,	   along	   with	   many	  Japanese	   concepts,	   by	   the	   works	   of	   Chinese	   philosophers	   like	   Confucius. 	   De9ining	   and	  3understanding	  the	  importance	  of	  Shinto	  and	  Bushidō	  provides	  great	  insight	  to	  the	  Japanese	  perspective,	  as	  they	  are	  de9ining	  characteristics	  of	  the	  culture,	  and	  exert	  in9luence	  on	  many	  aspects	  of	   Japanese	   thought,	   extending	   far	  beyond	   their	   roots	   in	   Japan’s	   feudal	  past.	  As	  a	  prominent	   Japanese	   politician,	   Nitobe	   Inazō,	   wrote	   in	   1899,	   “without	   understanding	  Feudalism	  and	  Bushidō,	  the	  moral	  ideas	  of	  modern	  Japan	  are	  a	  sealed	  volume.” 	  4	   Japan’s	  central	  philosophy	  was	  solidi9ied	  at	   the	  end	  of	   the	  twelfth	  century	  CE	  with	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  samurai	  and	  founding	  of	  the	  9irst	  shogunate	  in	  1192. 	  Before	  this	  date,	  power	  5in	  Japan	  was	  held	  by	  the	  emperor,	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  direct	  descendent	  of	  the	  sun	  goddess,	  Amaterasu.	   The	   shogun	   became	   de	   facto	   head	   of	   state	   after	   1192,	   creating	   a	   military	  government	  to	  replace	  the	  older	  aristocratic	  one.	  This	  placed	  control	  of	  the	  state	  9irmly	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  warrior	  class,	  blending	  aristocratic	  identity	  with	  warrior	  ideals.	  The	  total	  control	  that	  the	  warrior	  class	  held	  ensured	  that	  their	  code,	  Bushidō,	  would	  be	  pressed	  upon	  the	  people	  of	  Japan.	  That	  code	  quickly	  formed	  into	  the	  philosophy	  that	  would	  de9ine	  Japan	  for	  almost	  800	  years.	  Bushidō	   took	  hold	  and	  never	  completely	   let	  go.	  From	  1192	  to	  1868,	  the	   leaders	   of	   Japan	   were	   born,	   raised,	   ruled	   and	   died	   with	   the	   guiding	   principles	   of	  
Bushidō.	  	  	   Bushidō	  literally	  translates	  to	  “military	  knight	  ways”	  from	  bushi	  (a	  mounted	  warrior)	  and	   dō	   (a	   philosophical	   path), 	   but	   is	   often	   anglicized	   as	   the	   “Way	   of	   the	  Warrior.”	   The	  6control	   of	   Japan	   was	   held	   by	   men	   of	   the	   landed	   military	   class,	   who,	   unlike	   in	   Western	  feudalism,	  were	  warriors	  9irst	  and	  statesmen	  second. 	  Early	  Bushidō	  was	  heavily	  in9luenced	  7by	   aspects	   of	   Buddhism	   and	   Confucianism;	   a	   calm	   trust	   in	   fate	   was	   expected,	   as	   was	  friendliness	  with	  the	  concept	  of	  death. 	  Japan’s	  religion	  exerted	  great	  in9luence	  on	  Bushidō	  8as	  well.	  Shinto,	  the	  “Way	  of	  the	  Gods,”	  placed	  emphasis	  on	  the	  divine	  nature	  of	  the	  emperor,	  and,	   since	   the	   emperor	   represented	   the	   nation,	   all	   of	   Japan. 	   The	   tradition	   of	   ancestor	  9worship	  contributed	  to	  a	  sense	  of	  deeply	  ingrained	  loyalty,	  not	  only	  to	  the	  sovereign,	  but	  to	  any	   9igure	   in	  a	  position	  of	  power,	  especially	  within	   the	   family	  structure.	  These	   traditional	  religious	  roots	  effectively	  tied	  Bushidō	  to	  both	  religion	  and	  the	  past,	  thereby	  cementing	  it	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  individuals	  and	  the	  nation.	  	   As	   the	   philosophy	   became	  more	   and	  more	   a	   part	   of	   Japanese	   identity,	   it	   began	   to	  adopt	   new	  meaning.	   Children	   were	   raised	   on	   tales	   of	   famous	   warriors,	   the	   battles	   they	  fought,	  and	   the	  ways	   they	  exhibited	  valour,	   fortitude,	  bravery,	   fearlessness	  and	  courage. 	  10The	  concept	  of	  giri	  emerged,	  meaning	  “Right	  Reason.”	  At	  9irst,	  giri	  functioned	  as	  the	  idea	  of	  a	   moral	   imperative,	   meant	   to	   govern	   peoples’	   mannerisms	   and	   ensure	   morality,	   but	   it	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morphed	  into	  a	  type	  of	  social	  bind,	  facilitating	  moral	  sacri9ice	  for	  the	  good	  of	  the	  family	  or	  state. 	  This	  transformation	  was	  looked	  at	  with	  some	  disdain	  by	  certain	  members	  of	  society,	  11but	  its	  continuation	  throughout	  Japan’s	  feudal	  age	  and	  into	  its	  modern	  age	  is	  indicative	  of	  its	  resiliency	  in	  the	  mind	  of	  the	  population.	  	  	   The	  concept	  of	  honour	   is	  central	   to	  Bushidō,	  and	  since	  the	  philosophy	   is	  so	  closely	  related	   to	   the	   warrior	   class,	   preserving	   honour	   often	   meant	   reacting	   with	   violence	   and	  courage. 	  The	  men	  who	  ruled	  Japan	  lived	  with	  this	  notion	  of	  honour	  for	  hundreds	  of	  years.	  12The	   interplay	  between	  honour	  and	  shame	  was	  the	  central	  dichotomy	  of	   Japanese	  society;	  honour	   represented	   aggressive	   individualism	   and	   competition,	   and	   shame	   took	   on	   the	  meaning	  of	  conformity.	  Competition	  and	  collaboration	  formed	  the	  centrepiece	  of	  Japanese	  interpersonal	  relationships	  at	  the	  time, 	  a	  concept	  that,	  when	  brought	  into	  the	  modern	  era,	  13would	  mesh	  very	  well	  with	  emerging	  ideas	  of	  capitalism	  and	  democracy.	  The	  legacy	  of	  ie,	  or	  the	  “autonomy	  of	   the	  household,”	  would	  also	   lend	   its	  values	   to	   the	  modern	  state	  of	   Japan	  once	   its	  claims	  were	  contested	  by	  other	  nations.	   In	  the	   9irst	  half	  of	   the	  twentieth	  century,	  Japan	   had	   its	   autonomy	   challenged	   by	   evolving	   Western	   values	   and	   the	   leaders	   that	  expressed	  them.	  The	  samurai	  notion	  of	  competition	  led	  Japan	  to	  claim	  territory	  and	  start	  an	  empire	  at	  a	  time	  when	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world	  was	  giving	  that	  practice	  up.	  The	  9ight	  between	  individualism	   and	   conformity	   could	   be	   clearly	   seen	   in	   the	   Japanese	   approach	   to	   world	  politics;	   their	   desire	   to	   collaborate	   led	   them	   to	   be	   one	   of	   the	   9irst	   to	   join	   the	   League	   of	  Nations, 	  but	  their	  competitive	  nature	  compelled	  them	  to	  opportunistically	  seize	  territory	  14from	  neighbouring	  nations	  during	  what	  must	  have	  seemed	  to	  other	  states	  as	  inappropriate	  times.	  	   Bushidō	   could	   be	   harsh.	   Children	   were	   often	   taught	   endurance	   and	   toughness	   by	  being	  refused	  food	  or	  exposed	  to	  the	  elements	  for	  long	  periods	  of	  time. 	  A	  strong	  sense	  of	  15honour	   meant	   that	   any	   sort	   of	   underhanded	   dealing	   or	   crooked	   enterprise,	   though	  assuredly	  present	  in	  society,	  was	  considered	  extremely	  shameful. 	  A	  system	  of	  punishment	  16evolved	  during	  the	  Tokugawa	  Shogunate	  (1603-­‐1867)	  called	  kenka	  ryoseibai,	  an	  extremely	  harsh	  method	  that	  punished	  equally	  the	  antagonist	  of	  a	  crime	  and	  anyone	  who	  attempted	  to	  defend	  himself. 	  The	  only	  way	   to	  avoid	  punishment	  was	   to	   remain	  passive,	   a	   solution	  17that	  many	  samurai	  found	  to	  be	  the	  incorrect	  thing	  to	  do.	  Many	  chose	  to	  defend	  their	  honour,	  knowing	  full	  well	  that	  the	  punishment	  for	  doing	  so	  could	  be	  death. 	  This	  example	  is	  a	  good	  18metaphor	  for	  the	  way	  Japan	  handled	  itself	  in	  the	  twentieth	  century;	  like	  the	  samurai	  of	  old,	  Japan,	   cognizant	   of	   the	   rules	   set	   out	   by	   the	   League	   of	   Nations	   and	   understanding	   their	  import,	   continually	   ignored	   them	   in	   favour	   of	  what	   it	   deemed	  morally	   and	   economically	  right.	  	  	   One	  might	  think	  that	  these	  examples	  are	  too	  distant	  in	  Japanese	  history	  to	  have	  any	  sort	  of	  effect	  on	  twentieth	  century	  politics.	  However,	  like	  any	  other	  self-­‐realized	  nation,	  the	  Japanese	   have	   a	   very	   long	   cultural	   memory.	   Just	   as	   the	   Americans	   today	   tell	   and	   retell	  
	  Ibid,	  22.11	  Ikegami,	  Taming	  of	  the	  Samurai,	  30.12	  Ibid	  513	  Burkman,	  Japan	  and	  the	  League,	  xi.14	  Nitobe,	  Soul	  of	  Japan,	  27.15	  Ibid,	  20.16	  Ikegami,	  Taming	  of	  the	  Samurai,	  143.17	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stories	  of	  the	  founding	  fathers	  and	  the	  road	  to	  independence,	  the	  Japanese	  tell	  stories	  that	  epitomize	  their	  cultural	  heritage. 	  19One	  such	  story,	  possibly	  the	  most	  famous	  in	  Japan,	  is	  that	  of	  the	  47	  Ronin,	  a	  tale	  of	  revenge	  and	  ritual	   suicide	   that	   took	  place	   in	   the	   9irst	  years	  of	   the	  18th	   century.	  The	  story	  goes	   that	   there	  were	   two	   samurai	   who	   disliked	   one	   another.	   For	   reasons	   unknown,	   one	  drew	   his	   sword	   and	   attacked	   the	   other	   under	   the	   roof	   of	   the	   Shogun’s	   palace,	   where	  drawing	   a	   weapon	   was	   an	   offence	   punishable	   by	   death.	   He	   was	   compelled	   to	   commit	  
seppuku,	   ritual	   suicide,	   for	   his	   transgression.	   His	   house	   was	   dissolved	   and	   his	   servants	  became	  masterless.	  47	  of	  his	  former	  retainers,	  no	  longer	  samurai	  (for	  samurai	  were	  de9ined	  by	   their	   servile	   role),	   were	   outraged	   at	   this	   injustice	   and	   plotted	   revenge	   on	   the	   man	  responsible	   for	   goading	   their	  master	   to	   his	   death.	   Two	   years	   later,	   the	   47	   stormed	   their	  enemy’s	  villa	  and	  slaughtered	  his	  entire	  household.	  This	  blatantly	  illegal	  act	  perpetrated	  by	  the	  group	  earned	  them	  all	  seppuku,	  but	  it	  satis9ied	  their	  sense	  of	  honour.	  After	  all	  this	  had	  happened,	  the	  story	  began	  to	  spread	  like	  wild9ire,	  being	  represented	  in	  theatre	  and	  song	  all	  around	  the	  country.	  The	  shogun,	  of	  course,	  attempted	  to	  censor	  it,	  but	  the	  story’s	  themes	  of	  righteousness	  and	  moral	  obligation	  appealed	  to	   the	  Bushidō	   spirit	  of	   the	  samurai	  and	  the	  rebellious	  pipe-­‐dreams	  of	  the	  peasantry.	  The	  story	  of	  the	  47	  Ronin	  remains	  today	  one	  of	  the	  most	  popular	  cultural	  legends	  in	  Japan,	  a	  telling	  indicator	  of	  the	  value	  the	  Japanese	  place	  in	  remembering	  the	  past. 	  20Feudal	  Japan	  and	  the	  philosophy	  of	  Bushidō	  greatly	  in9luenced	  the	  way	  their	  leaders	  approached	   modern	   problems	   when	   brought	   into	   the	   industrial	   age	   by	   the	   West.	   The	  samurai	  ruled	  Japan	  when	  the	  nation	  was	  pulled	  into	  the	  world	  at	  large,	  and	  they	  continued	  to	  rule	  it	  during	  industrialization,	  when	  they	  struggled	  to	  balance	  old	  traditions	  with	  new	  ideologies.	   This	  was	   an	   issue	   because	   of	   the	   unique	  nature	   of	   Japanese	   industrialization;	  unlike	  other	  nations	  that	  built	  toward	  it	  slowly	  and	  embraced	  it	  over	  the	  course	  of	  decades,	  Japan	  refused	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  phenomena	  for	  many	  years	  and	  then	  adopted	  as	  much	  as	  they	  could	  in	  extremely	  short	  order.	  The	  rapid	  nature	  of	  Japanese	  industrialization	  allowed	  the	  nation	  to	  retain	  much	  of	  its	  feudal	  mindset,	  leading	  to	  a	  clash	  between	  old	  and	  new	  that	  was	   far	   more	   intense	   than	   in	   Europe.	   The	   continuation	   of	   one	   ruling	   class	   through	   this	  transitory	  period	  ensured	  that	  old	  values	  were	  used	  to	   judge	  new	  situations, 	   to	  varying	  21degrees	  of	  effectiveness.	  The	   values	   developed	   during	   Japan’s	   feudal	   period	   impacted	   their	   conduct	   in	   the	  modern	  era.	  Defeating	  China	  in	  1895	  and	  Russia	  in	  1905	  solidi9ied	  Japan’s	  place	  as	  a	  power	  to	  be	   reckoned	  with	   in	   the	   eyes	  of	   other	  nations	   around	   the	  world.	  These	   two	  wars	   also	  created	  a	  Japanese	  sphere	  of	  in9luence	  on	  mainland	  China,	  an	  important	  development	  that	  would	  have	  serious	  rami9ications	  in	  the	  coming	  decades.	  Japan	  again	  marched	  to	  war	  when	  9ighting	  broke	  out	  in	  1914,	  honouring	  its	  alliance	  with	  the	  British.	  	  Japanese	   participation	   in	   the	   First	   World	   War	   was	   directed	   toward	   the	   German	  territory	   in	   China.	   Germany	   had	   poured	   200	   million	   marks	   into	   its	   Chinese	   holdings,	  making	   them	   strategic	   points	   of	   interest	   for	   the	   industrially-­‐minded	   Japanese. 	   The	  22
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Germans	   also	  presented	   a	   threat	   to	   newly-­‐won	   Japanese	   in9luence	   on	   the	   continent.	   In	   a	  matter	   of	  weeks,	   Japan	   pushed	   the	   light	   German	   garrisons	   out	   of	   China	   and	   secured	   the	  Shangdong	   Peninsula	   for	   itself. 	   This	   swift	   campaign	   ended	   the	   sense	   of	   Western	  23(particularly	  British)	  paternalism	  in	  Japan;	  no	  longer	  did	  it	  consider	  itself	  a	  student	  of	  the	  West. 	   Japan’s	   assertive	   nature	   in	   these	   three	  wars	   also	   re9lects	   the	   lingering	   aspects	   of	  24
Bushidō,	   still	  present	   in	   the	   traditional	  mindset	  of	   the	  ruling	  class.	   Japanese	  concern	  over	  their	  sphere	  of	  in9luence	  was	  a	  manifestation	  of	  ie,	  the	  “autonomy	  of	  the	  household,”	  albeit	  on	   a	   larger	   scale.	   By	   asserting	   and	   solidifying	   its	   position	   in	   East	   Asia,	   Japan	   de9ined	   its	  household	  and	  established	  quite	   clearly	   that	   it	  was	   capable	  of	  defending	   that	   space.	  This	  tendency	  toward	  de9ining,	  claiming	  and	  controlling	  space	  quickly	  began	  to	  incorporate	  giri,	  the	  “Right	  Reason.”	  In	  the	  lead	  up	  to	  the	  Second	  World	  War,	  Japan’s	  pursuit	  of	  an	  East	  Asian	  sphere	  of	  domination	  would	  be	   justi9ied	  by	   the	   concept	  of	  giri,	   and	   ie	  would	  provide	   the	  motivation	  to	  defend	  that	  idea	  with	  a	  degree	  of	  fanaticism	  that	  surprised	  many.	  	  Japanese	  relations	  with	  the	  West	  began	  to	  break	  down	  almost	   immediately	  after	   it	  claimed	   victory	   over	   the	   Germans	   in	   China.	   In	   1915,	   Japan,	   in	   a	   bid	   to	   consolidate	   its	  continental	  power,	  issued	  the	  21	  Demands	  to	  China.	  Under	  threat	  of	  war,	  the	  Chinese	  were	  asked	   to	   recognize	   Japanese	   control	   of	   Shangdong	   and	   Manchuria	   and	   to	   stop	   leasing	  territory	   to	   other	   foreign	   powers.	   The	   demands	   also	   provided	   for	   Japanese	   economic	  ambition;	  railroads	  were	  built,	  companies	  were	  merged,	  and	  land	  was	  leased. 	  After	  asking	  25for	  a	  few	  revisions,	  which	  the	  Japanese	  granted,	  China	  agreed	  to	  the	  demands,	  knowing	  full	  well	   it	   could	   not	   9ight	   another	  war	   against	   Japan	   and	   hope	   to	  win.	   The	  Western	   powers,	  wary	  of	   growing	   Japanese	   ambition,	  were	  not	   happy	   about	   this	   turn	  of	   events	   and	  made	  sure	  to	  let	  Japan	  know	  it.	  Seizing	  power	  and	  land	  from	  the	  Chinese,	  as	  Japan	  had	  observed	  other	   nations	   doing	   in	   previous	   decades,	   provided	   both	   economic	   stability	   and	   political	  legitimacy,	  and	  contributed	  to	  the	  sense	  of	  autonomy	  that	  the	  Japanese	  state	  felt	  entitled	  to.	  	  The	   end	  of	   the	  First	  World	  War	   saw	   the	  West	   recoil	   from	   the	  horrors	   of	   violence.	  Democracy	   9lourished	   and	   Wilsonian	   idealism	   became	   widespread. 	   Unfortunately	   for	  26Japan,	  some	  of	  these	  new	  ideals	  clashed	  with	  many	  of	  their	  own	  historic	  values,	  and	  those	  learned	   in	   the	   nineteenth	   century.	   Democracy	   and	   capitalism	   meshed	   well	   with	   the	  dichotomy	  of	  collaboration	  and	  competition	  etched	  into	  their	  cultural	  memory	  by	  their	  long	  feudal	  period,	  but	  the	  concepts	  of	  self-­‐determination	  and	  free	  world	  trade	  put	  forward	  by	  Wilson	  in	  the	  years	  after	  the	  First	  World	  War	  con9licted	  with	  the	  need	  for	  the	  Japanese	  to	  have	   clearly	   de9ined	   hierarchies,	   rulers,	   and	   boundaries.	   According	   to	   Japanese	   feudal	  policy	  and	  cultural	  memory,	  there	  must	  always	  be	  those	  in	  power	  and	  those	  who	  serve;	  that	  concept	   is	   central	   to	   the	  philosophy	  of	  Bushidō,	   and	   to	   the	   respect	   of	   sovereign	  privilege	  embedded	  in	  Shinto.	  Owing	  to	  this	  fundamental	  disconnect,	  the	  Japanese	  frequently	  found	  themselves	  marginalized	  and	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  other	  members	  of	   the	  League	  of	  Nations. 	  27Much	  of	  it	  had	  to	  do	  with	  race	  (the	  Western	  powers	  were	  still	  uncomfortable	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  an	  Asian	  nation	  on	  par	  with	  their	  own),	  but	  a	  lot	  of	  Western	  hostility	  was	  engendered	  by	  
	  Ibid.23	  Ibid,	  5.24	  Michael	  Duffy,	  “Primary	  Documents	  –	  ’21	  Demands’	  Made	  by	  Japan	  to	  China,	  18	  January	  1915,”	  para	  4,	  259irstworldwar.com,	  last	  modi9ied	  August	  22,	  2009,	  http://www.9irstworldwar.com/source/21demands.htm.	  Elise	  K.	  Tipton,	  Society	  and	  the	  State	  in	  Interwar	  Japan	  (London:	  Routledge,	  1997),	  5.26	  Burkman,	  Japan	  and	  the	  League,	  4.27
Mount Royal Undergraduate Humanities Review 3
Sawyer, “The Way of the Warrior”  6
Japan’s	   insistence	  on	  maintaining	   the	  principles	  of	   the	  early	   twentieth	  century,	  principles	  that	   the	  West	   now	   found	   to	   be	   deplorable.	   Japan	   believed	   it	   could	   balance	   the	   League’s	  objective	   of	   preserving	   the	   status	   quo	   with	   its	   own	   interests	   in	   expanding	   Japanese	  in9luence, 	  despite	  the	  veiled	  hostility	  directed	  toward	  it	  by	  the	  other	  members.	  28In	  the	  1920s,	  Japan	  saw	  its	  foreign	  economic	  fortunes	  rise	  as	  a	  result	  of	  its	  Chinese	  territories.	   The	   formerly	   German	   holdings	   had	   provided	   quality	   ship-­‐building	   ports,	  allowing	  the	  Japanese	  navy	  to	  grow	  in	  size	  and	  strength,	  and	  Japanese	  investment	  in	  local	  industry	  had	  given	  them	  36.3%	  of	  the	  Chinese	  market	  by	  1919. 	  Though	  the	  people	  were	  29often	  subject	  to	   famine	  as	  a	  result	  of	  mishandled	  loans, 	   the	  Japanese	  had	  emerged	  from	  30the	  First	  World	  War	  far	  more	  aware	  of	   foreign	  pressure,	   if	  not	  particularly	  receptive	  to	   it.	  Japanese	  politics	   in	   the	   interwar	  period	  have	  been	   termed	  mushisou,	   or	   “ideal-­‐less;”	   they	  saw	  the	  emerging	  ideologies	  of	  Wilson	  and	  Lenin	  as	  hypocritical	  and	  contradictory	  to	  the	  traditional	   Japanese	   values	   developed	   during	   the	   Tokugawa	   Shogunate.	   Japan	   became	  disillusioned	  with	   the	   “altruistic”	  motivation	  of	  Wilsonian	  policy,	   in	  particular	  after	  being	  on	  the	  losing	  side	  of	  economic	  deals	  and	  treaties. 	  	  Despite	  the	  21	  Demands	  being	  annulled	  31during	   the	  Washington	   Conference	   of	   1921,	   Japan	   continued	   to	   exploit	   its	   territories	   in	  China. 	  32The	  same	  appeasement	  mentality	  that	  enabled	  Hitler	  to	  grow	  so	  powerful	  also	  had	  a	  part	   to	  play	   in	   the	   rise	  of	   the	   Japanese	  Empire,	  but,	  ultimately,	   Japan	  was	  pushed	   toward	  con9lict	   by	   its	   inability	   to	   properly	   reconcile	   feudal	   philosophy	   with	   modern	   idealism.	  Elements	  of	  Bushidō,	  infused	  with	  ancient	  Shinto	  tradition	  and	  developed	  over	  almost	  700	  years	   of	   intense	   inward	   scrutiny,	   persisted	   in	   Japan’s	   cultural	   memory	   after	   its	  industrialization.	   The	   concept	   of	   household	   autonomy	   in	   particular	   informed	   Japanese	  policy	  between	  the	  World	  Wars,	  and	  the	  quintessentially	  Japanese	  interpretation	  of	  honour	  (that	  it	  be	  maintained	  through	  violent	  and	  courageous	  action)	  was	  perfectly	  visible	  in	  their	  seizure	   of	   Chinese	   territory	   and	   in	   its	   quiet	   indignation	   in	   response	   to	   perceived	  condescendence	  and	  insulting	  political	  marginalization	  from	  the	  Western	  powers.	  In	  1931,	  Japan	   withdrew	   from	   the	   League	   of	   Nations	   in	   the	   face	   of	   condemnation	   toward	   their	  invasion	  of	  Manchuria,	  an	  action	  undertaken	  to	  satisfy	  territorial	  claims	  present	  since	  1905,	  and	   to	   feed	   the	   already	   raging	   9ire	   of	   the	   Japanese	   industrial	   complex.	   This	   was	   the	  beginning	   of	   the	   “9ifteen	   year	   war,” 	   the	   con9lict	   that	   would	   come	   to	   be	   known	   by	   the	  33Japanese	  as	  The	  Paci9ic	  War,	  or,	  in	  Europe,	  The	  Second	  World	  War.	  Japan’s	  participation	  in	  the	  con9lict	  that	  would	  de9ine	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  20th	  century	  was	  predicated	  upon	  a	  700	  year-­‐old	  philosophy	  that	  was	  twisted	  by	  unexpected	  modernization.	  Bibliography	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